2017年公共英语五级考试经典阅读材料

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President Clinton’s decision on Apr.8 to send Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji packing without an agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization seemed to be a massive miscalculation. The President took a drubbing from much of the press, which had breathlessly reported that a deal was in the bag. The Cabinet and Whit House still appeared divided, and business leaders were characterized as furious over the lost opportunity. Zhu charged that Clinton lacked “the courage” to reach an accord. And when Clinton later telephoned the angry Zhu to pledge a renewed effort at negotiations, the gesture was widely portrayed as a flip-flop.

In fact, Clinton made the right decision in holding out for a better WTO deal. A lot more horse trading is needed before a final agreement can be reached. And without the Administration’s goal of a “bullet-proof agreement” that business lobbyists can enthusiastically sell to a Republican Congress, the whole process will end up in partisan acrimony that could harm relations with China for years.

THE HARD PART. Many business lobbyists, while disappointed that the deal was not closed, agree that better terms can still be had. And Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, National Economic Council Director Gene B. Sperling, Commerce Secretary William M. Daley, and top trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky all advised Clinton that while the Chinese had made a remarkable number of concessions, “we’re not there yet,” according to senior officials.

Negotiating with Zhu over the remaining issues may be the easy part. Although Clinton can signal U.S. approval for China’s entry into the WTO himself, he needs Congress to grant Beijing permanent most-favored-nation status as part of a broad trade accord. And the temptation for meddling on Capital Hill may prove over-whelming. Zhu had barely landed before Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) declared himself skeptical that China deserved entry into the WTO. And Senators Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.) and Emest F. Hollings (D-S. C.) promised to introduce a bill requiring congressional approval of any deal.

The hidden message from these three textile-state Southerners: Get more protection for the U. S. clothing industry. Hoping to smooth the way, the Administration tried, but failed, to budge Zhu on textiles. Also left in the lurch: Wall Street, Hollywood, and Detroit. Zhu refused to open up much of the lucrative Chinese securities market and insisted on “cultural” restrictions on American movies and music. He also blocked efforts to allow U. S. auto makers to provide fleet financing.

BIG JOB. Already, business lobbyists are blanketing Capitol Hill to presale any eventual agreement, but what they’ve heard so far isn’t encouraging. Republicans, including Lott, say that “the time just isn’t right” for the deal. Translation: We’re determined to make it look as if Clinton has capitulated to the Chinese and is ignoring human, religious, and labor rights violations; the theft of nuclear-weapons technology; and the sale of missile parts to America’s enemies. Beijing’s fierce critics within the Democratic Party, such as Senator Paul D. Wellstone of Minnesota and House Minority leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, won’t help, either.

Just how tough the lobbying job on Capitol Hill will be become clear on Apr. 20, when Rubin lectured 19chief executives on the need to discipline their Republican allies. With business and the White House still trading charges over who is responsible for the defeat of fast-track trade negotiating legislation in 1997, working together won’t be easy. And Republicans-with a wink-say that they’ll eventually embrace China’s entry into the WTO as a favor to Corporate America. Though not long before they torture Clinton. But Zhu is out on a limb, and if Congress overdoes the criticism, he may be forced by domestic critics to renege. Business must make this much dear to both its GOP allies and the Whit House: This historic deal is too important to risk losing to any more partisan squabbling.

翻译参考：

克林顿总统关于4月8日发送中国总理朱镕基包装而没有就中国加入世界贸易组织达成协议的决定似乎是一个巨大的错误估计。总统从大多数新闻界的一个小伙子，他们气喘吁吁地报告说，一个交易是在袋里。内阁和惠特议院仍然出现分歧，商界领袖被描绘为对失去的机会感到愤怒。朱(金字旁容)基指出，克林顿没有“勇气”达成协议。当克林顿后来打电话给愤怒的朱，承诺在谈判中重新努力，这个姿态被广泛描绘成一个人字拖。

事实上，克林顿作出了一个正确的决定，为了更好的'世贸组织协议。在达成最终协议之前需要更多的马交易。如果没有政府的目标，商业游说者可以积极地向共和党国会出售一份“防弹协议”，整个过程将结束为多方关系，可能伤害与中国的关系多年。

硬件部分。许多商业游说人士虽然对该交易没有结束感到失望，但同意仍然可以有更好的条款。财政部长Robert E. Rubin，国家经济委员会主任Gene B. Sperling，商务部长William M. Daley和顶级贸易谈判代表Charlene Barshefsky都建议克林顿说，虽然中国人做出了许多让步，“我们不是还有，“高级官员说。

与其余的问题谈判可能是容易的部分。虽然克林顿可以表示美国批准中国自己加入世贸组织，但他需要国会给予北京永久最惠国地位作为广泛贸易协定的一部分。而在首都山的干预的诱惑可能证明是太过分了。朱先生刚刚在参议院多数党领导人特伦特·洛特(R-Miss)宣布自己怀疑我国应该加入世贸组织。参议员Jesse A. Helms(R-N.C。)和Emest F. Hollings(D-S.C。)答应提出一项法案，要求国会批准任何交易。

这三个纺织国家南方人的隐藏的信息：为美国服装行业获得更多的保护。希望顺利通过，当局试图，但失败，让朱先生在纺织业。还留在徘徊：华尔街，好莱坞和底特律。朱先生拒绝开放大量有利可图的中国证券市场，坚持对美国电影和音乐的“文化”限制。他还阻止了允许美国汽车制造商提供车队融资的努力。

大工作。商业游说人士已经为国会山预留任何最终协议，但他们迄今为止所听到的并不令人鼓舞。共和党人，包括洛特，说，“刚刚是不正确的时间”的交易。翻译：我们决心让它看起来好像克林顿已经向中国投降，并且忽视了人权，宗教和劳工权利的侵犯;偷窃核武器技术;并向美国的敌人出售导弹部件。北京民主党内的激烈批评者，如明尼苏达州的保罗·威尔斯通参议员和密苏里州少数民族领导人理查德·Gephardt，也不会帮助。

在4月20日，Rubin向19chie的高管讲述了需要管理共和党盟友的问题时，国会山的游说工作如何艰难。与商业和白宫仍然交易费用谁谁负责在1997年的快速贸易谈判立法失败，一起工作将不容易。和共和党人 - 眨眼，说他们最终会拥抱中国加入WTO，作为美国公司的利益。虽然不久之前他们折磨克林顿。但是，朱镕基在肢体上，如果国会超过批评，他可能被国内批评者强迫叛变。商业必须让它非常珍惜它的GOP盟友和惠特议院：这个历史性的协议太重要，不会有失去更多的党派争吵的风险。